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in expansive working, as moist steam being a better conductor of 
heat than dry, parts with its heat more rapidly to any neighboring 
conducting material of a lower temperature. It is not by the addi- 
tion of a steam jacket that the evil of condensation, attendant upon 
the rate of expansion, can be averted, as this will necessarily take 
place from the constancy of natural aws; but the liquefaction will 
take place in the steam jacket, instead of the cylinder, with entirely 
different results. Condensation i the former case can do no serious 
harm; for instead of being lost in the Condenser, and carrying off 
heat, it is returned to the boilers by a return pipe, proceeding from 
the bottom of the jacket. 
From the results of extended practical observation of the duty 
developed by the various descriptions of English pumping engines, 
the Cornish stands pre.eminent for its remarkable conomy; the 
duty in one case, having amounted to 130,000,000 pounds of water 
raised one foot high by 112 pounds of coal. Future developments 
looking to an increased rate of economy, may be looked for in the 
possible adaptation of the compound principle appliedto the Cornish 
type. 
W. M. HENDERSON, 
Hydraulic Engineer. 
Philadelphia, May 9th, 1868. 
PATENTING A PRINCIPLE, 
(Concluded from page 414.) 
It is unnecessary to go through all the cases in the English books 
to which this explanation applies. One, which was determined by 
our own Supreme Court, deserves to be noticed here, especially 
because it was considered at the same term with O'Reilly v. Morse, 
and both mast have been together in the minds of the judges-- 
that of Winans v. Dennacad, 15 t{ow. 330. The plaintiff's inven- 
tion consisted in constructing coal-cars in the form of the frustum 
of a cone. The defendant's cars were octagonal instead of circular, 
but otherwise resembled the plaintiff's. One of the judges inclined 
to the opinion that the plaintiff was, by the terms of his patent, 
limited to the precise form he had described, and could have no 
remedy against others who used a different one, It was shown 
that there was no practical difference between the two; but either 
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would derive especial strength from the mechanical law involved. 
And, though the plaintiff's claim was, in express terms, to the 
frustum of a cone; though he did not pretend to claim the me- 
chauicat law thus applied, the defendant was held to have violated 
his patent. This could not be on the ground that the principle of 
mechanics was patented. It must have been on the ground that 
the tbrm adopted by the defendants was a mere equivalent for that 
of the plaintiff'. 
It may be said that what have been designated as mechanical 
laws in the preceding pages, are in truth laws of nature, physical 
just as much as the properties of matter, and that the two classes 
run into each other, so that no distinction can be made between 
them. It is not necessary to insist that there may be in theory. 
In practice, there is a radical difference which fully justifies their 
being considered as belonging to two classes. In the case of in- 
ventions founded on what have been termed mechanical principles, 
the patentee obtains full protection in the exclusive njoyment of 
the principle by being allowed an action against every one who 
uses an equivalent for his device. No machine can be constructed 
on the principle of his which does not embrace such equivalents. 
It may not be so where the novelty of the invention consists in 
some property of matter first brought to light by the patentee. 
Neilson's patent covered the use of a vessel for heating air placed 
between the blower and the furnace--not the introduction of heated 
air into the furnace, which was truly his discovery. I f  any one 
could have contrived to heat the air sufficiently before it entered 
the blower, he might have availed hinlself of Neilson's discovery 
with impunity. The difficulty of doing this constituted the whole 
strength of his patent. Anybody might have availed himself of 
the quality of lead discovered by the Tathams, if he could have 
got up a machine of a different construction. It is very possible 
that the courts may give a larger range to the doctrine of equiv- 
alents, in order to secure to the discoverer of a new physical 
property an adequate reward for his ingenuity. Thus far, it is- 
only as the defendant has been found to :have employed mechanical 
equivalents for the construction specified by the patentee, that he 
has been held guilty of infringement, or the patentee has obtained 
protection. 
There are a few other cases upon this subject which are not open 
to the explanation given to those heretofore mentioned, and which 
may be thought o require a passing notice. 
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The plaintiff in Forsyth v. Riviere, 1 W: P. C. 97, after describing 
in his specification the explosive compounds employed by him in 
igniting the charge in fire-arms, added: " I  tic not lay claim to the 
invention of any of the said compounds," &e., "my invention in 
regard thereto being confined to the use and application thereof to 
the purposes of artillery and fire-arms as aforesaid. And the man- 
ner of priming and exploding which I use is," &c., proceeding to 
describe it. There was no specification of claim. It is manifest 
that ~his patent was for the method he employed. It is true that 
the reporter says the defendant's lock was constructed ifferently ; 
but he does not furnish the slightest intimation in what respect it 
varied. The note of the case is very short and unsatisfactory. The 
report, bearing the same title in Chit. Pr. C. 182, is upon another 
point entirely. But from the statement of the counsel in Minter v. 
Wells, W. P. C. 128, we learn that all the difference between the 
locks was this : in the patentee's the hammer struck the pan con- 
taining the composition, and in the defendant's the pan struck the 
hammer. 
No one can read the patent of the plaintiff in Halt v. Boot, 1 W. 
P. C. 100, without perceiving that he laid claim to hi s machinery 
when used in connection with gas flame. There was no positive 
evidence what machinery the defendants used, it is true i but this 
does not warrant he inference that the court recognized the plain- 
gift's title to the exclusive use of gas flame with any machinery for 
the same purpose. There was circumstantial proof of the strong. 
est kind that the defendant's was borrowed from the plaintiff's, and 
was identical with it. 
The claim set up in Booth v. Kennard, 1 Hurls. & N. 5271 was 
tbr "making gas direct from seeds and matters herein named for 
practical illumination, or other useful purposes, instead of making 
it from oils, resins, or gums previously extracted from such sub- 
stances." Upon the trial of the case, POLLOCK, C. B., held this 
claim to be too broad, and directed a verdict for the defendant. 
The verdict was set aside inthe Court of Exchequer Chamber; and 
from the report it would certainly seem as if the court considered 
the patent valid. But when the CaUSe came on for trial again before 
Chief Baron POLLOCK, he said that the court had decided nothing 
more ~han this : :that the invention "was one which~ if.new, might 
be patented if properly specified." He added i "we are also of 
opinion that the claim is too large, and that such elai~ cannot be 
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supported." There was a verdictfor the defendant again. But as 
there was also strong evidence upon that trial that the invention 
was not new, the plaintiff probably deemed it unsafe to proceed any 
further, after moving that a verdict should be entered up for him, 
and being denied. Litt]e or no reliance is manifestly to be placed 
on the report of the decision in the Exchequer Chamber, after the 
explanation given by Chief Baron POLLOCK. 
The plaintiff in Seed v. IIiggins, 8 Ell. & 131. 755, 7717 and 6 Jur. 
N. S. 1264, had originally taken out a patent for the application of 
the law or principle of centrifugal force to the particular or special 
purpose above set forth ;" i. e. to fliers used for preparing, shbbing, 
or roving cotton, &e., so as to pro~luce ahard and evenly compressed 
bobbin. Ite afterwards discovered that centrifugal force had been 
employed already for the same purpose, though by different means ; 
and he therefore filed a disclaimer, by which he limited himself to 
the mechanism he had described in his specification. Upon this a 
a question arose whether his patent did not, when thus amended, 
appropriate a different invention from anything embraced in his 
original specification, and was not therefore void. The case was 
very fully discussed in several courts, but was finally decided against 
the plaintiff upon the ground that the defendant's machine was no 
infringement of the patent. In the course of delivering their 
opinions it was incidentally mentioned by one or more of the 
judges, that the defendant's machine came within the purview of 
the patent as originally framed. But there was no opinion ex- 
pressed throughout as to the validity of the original patent, nor 
any allusion made to the subject. I f  it may be inferred from the 
silence observed respecting it that the validity of the instrument 
was admitted, there is some propriety in referring to the ease when 
examining this doctrine. It will probably be regarded by most as 
of no weight whatever. 
The court interpreted the second claim made by the plaintiff, in 
Bovill v. Keyworth, 7 Ell. & ]31. 724, to be for "exhausting the air 
from the cases of the millstones, combined with the application of 
a blast to the grinding surfaces." Upon this, Lord CA~PS~LL, who 
presided, remarked as follows, viz. : "Still if the specification does 
not point out the mode by which this part of the process (No. 2) is 
to be conducted, so as to accomplish the object in view, ig would 
be a statement of a principle, and the patent would be invalid." 
tie held it to be sufficient, however. And it may well be doubted 
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whether it was fairly open to the objection that it would have been 
for a principle without a description of the process, though such a 
description was no doubt essential. The case belongs to a class 
which has been often supposed to involve the legality of patenting 
a principle, but really has little to do with it. A blast and an ex- 
haust are two mechanical forces as well known as a stream of water 
or as steam. Every artisan skilled in tile business is perfectly 
familiar with them, and knows how to produce them. The inven- 
tion in this instance consisted in combining the two so as to pro- 
duce a particular effect. After describing how this might be done, 
the specification defines the invention as consisting in the combina- 
tion of these two forces, each applied to a particular and well 
known mechanism. In all this we see nothing like patenting a
principle, and apprehend, there was no foundation for the remark 
of his Lordship. l ie may have had an idea that the patent would 
have been defective in not specifying some visible structure as the 
invention; but that is very different from patenting a principle. 
The case has little or no bearing on that subject. 
From this discussion and examination of the cases the following 
conclusions are legitimately drawn: 
1. Every discoverer of a new and useful application of any law 
of nature, any quality of matter, or any mathematical principle, is 
entitled to a patent :for it. 
2. It is not necessary to entitle him to a patent, that he should 
have been the first to search out and make known the law, quality, 
or principle which he has thus applied. And his llaving been the 
first to bring it to light adds nothing to his claims. 
3. I-Ie will be protected in his right by holding as infringements 
of' his patent all mechanical equivalents for the devices for carry- 
ing his discovery into effbct, which he has described and designated 
in his specification as his invention. And he can have no other 
protection, even though the principle he has applied was first dis- 
covered by him. 
4. No one can legally specify as his invention, and take out a 
patent for the exclusive use of any such law, quality, or principle 
when employed for the same 'purpose as his. No instance can be 
found where any such patent has been sustained, and they have 
been repeatedly pronounced invalid by the courts. 
S.H .H .  
